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Casanova
Kyle Butt, Derek Sorensen, and Michael Stay
Abstract—We introduce Casanova, a leaderless optimistic consensus protocol designed for a permissioned blockchain. Casanova
produces blocks in a DAG rather than a chain, and combines voting rounds with block production by singling out individual conflicting
transactions.
Index Terms—Consensus protocol, Byzantine fault tolerant, Directed acyclic graph, Partially synchronous
✦
1 INTRODUCTION
The problem of achieving consensus over an asynchronous
network between mutually distrustful parties has been a
subject of research for several decades. After Nakamoto
introduced Bitcoin [1], a new class of consensus algorithms
emerged, making use of either miners or some kind of
leader election. These include: proof of work (PoW), proof
of stake (PoS), and proof of elapsed time (PoET) protocols,
among others. Classical protocols, by contrast, tend to rely
on rounds of message passing [2]. Proof of work algorithms
are inherently inefficient because their security properties
come from “wasted” computation, e.g. brute forcing hash
preimages. The blockchain community is naturally inter-
ested in finding reliable and scalable consensus algorithms
suited to use in a proof of stake context.
We present Casanova, a leaderless optimistic consensus
protocol optimized for the blockchain, but which borrows
from pre-Nakamoto consensus protocols. It would be appro-
priate for a proof-of-stake blockchain, but can be used in a
variety of applications. It shows that one can pipeline voting
and message-passing rounds by combining block creation
with votes, and optimizes for the overwhelmingly common
case that a transaction is not a double spend.
Casanova emerged from two principal observations. The
first is that, as a rule, transactions on a blockchain do not
conflict. The majority of users do not double spend because
they want their transactions to clear quickly. Despite this
fact, modern consensus protocols spend resources coming to
consensus among alternatives on every transaction, regard-
less of whether or not any conflicting transactions have been
seen. This is excessive and inefficient. Casanova achieves
safety, liveness, and scalability by primarily running a con-
flict exclusion protocol, using a choice consensus protocol only
when necessary for the occasional double spend, and only
for the conflicting transactions. Conflicting transactions do
not delay non-conflicting transactions in the same block.
Classical consensus algorithms are generally not suited
to take advantage of this apparent lack of conflict because
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they make two assumptions that are not true in a blockchain
context:
1) Processors begin with an initial value v ∈ V , where
V is the value domain.
2) Values v ∈ V are readily forged. This assumption
is usually implicit in the defenses against Byzantine
behavior.
Casanova is able to take advantage of the general absence
of double spends by removing these assumptions.
The second observation is that transactions do not
need to be totally ordered. A partial order will suffice, as
most transactions are unrelated. Current blockchains record
transactions in a single chain, creating a total order between
all transactions. Unrelated transactions do not need to be or-
dered, only related transactions (e.g. I received some money
I later spent). By structuring transactions in a partial order,
rather than a total order, Casanova is able to allow each
validator to produce blocks at a regular interval rather than
requiring mining or leader election to produce a single block
at a regular interval.
For this reason, in Casanova, blocks do not form a chain,
but a directed acyclic graph.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 Network Requirements
To achieve liveness we assume partial synchrony, which is
that the network delivers any message within some finite
time bound ∆. We do not need to know, or even have an
estimate of ∆ at any point. To achieve safety, on the other
hand, our network can be totally asynchronous. Messages
can be arbitrarily dropped, reordered, or duplicated.
2.2 Events and Transactions
We assume some set of all possible events, E. We also
assume that E is suitably partitioned into mutually exclusive
alternatives:
E =
⊔
i∈I
Ei
for some indexing set I . That is, each event e ∈ E belongs
to exactly one Ei and at most one such event could have
occurred. We call the events transactions if there exists some
Ei that contains more than one event. We assume from any
transaction ei that the conflict index i can be computed, and
that we have a suitable function index : index(ei ∈ Ei) = i
22.3 Graph theoretic notions
A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is a directed graph with no
cycles. A cycle is a path along graph edges whose source
and target are the same vertex. In the case of Casanova, any
edge in the DAG has as its source a child block and as its
target a direct parent of the child. A leaf is a graph vertex
that is the source to some (possibly empty) set of edges but
target to none.
Note that a finite nonempty DAG always has a
nonempty set of leaves. To find a leaf, one can choose a
vertex at random and follow any reverse path until termi-
nation. In the DAG consisting of one vertex (and no edges),
that vertex is a leaf. In particular, the genesis block alone
is a leaf. To disambiguate nodes in a DAG from nodes in
the network, we use the term validator to refer to a network
node, and block to refer to a node in the DAG.
Casanova builds a DAG of blocks instead of a chain.
Each block contains a reference to one or more parents. An
individual validator is not allowed to produce a block that
is not a descendant of their most recent block. Violating this
requirement is called equivocation and is a fault.
We will occasionally abuse notation and treat a DAG as
either a set of blocks or a set of transactions. When we treat it
as a set of blocks, we mean the underlying set of blocks, and
when we treat it as a set of transactions, we mean the union
of transactions over the underlying set of blocks. We also
use + to represent adding a block to a DAG. The meaning
should be clear as the block contains its parent links.
2.4 Consensus on a DAG
A DAG-consensus algorithm for a set of partitioned events
E =
⊔
i∈I
Ei is a protocol together with a family of functions
decidei, i ∈ I , from DAGs to Ei + P(Ei), the disjoint
union of Ei with the powerset of Ei. It either returns the
decision or a set of known alternatives when no decision
has been reached. If decidei(D) ∈ Ei, then we say a val-
idator with DAG D has decided on ei = decidei(D). If
decidei(D) = ∅, then D does not include any transaction
ei ∈ Ei. If decidei(D) = Ei ∈ P(Ei) ∧ Ei 6= ∅, then
Ei is the set of currently known alternatives. In particular
if |Ei| = 1, this is not the same as a decision. In the absence
of new alternatives a representative from Ei will eventually
be chosen.
Stating the requirement about “eventually cho-
sen” more formally: If decidei(D) = Ei ⊂ Ei,
Ei 6= ∅, D ⊂ D
′, decidei(D
′) ∈ Ei and D
′ does not contain
any transactions in Ei not already in D, then decidei(D
′)
must be an element of Ei.
2.4.1 Safety
Assume that we have a DAG D as seen by a validator
V such that ei = decidei(D) ∈ Ei for some i. For every
validator W 6= V let DW be the induced sub-DAG created
by taking the most-recent blocks created by W and every
ancestor block of those blocks. A DAG-consensus algorithm
is safe if for every correct validator W 6= V the protocol
cannot create a DAG D′ which contains DW as a subgraph
s.t. e′i = decidei(D
′) ∈ Ei and e
′
i 6= ei. More succinctly:
6 ∃D′.DW ⊂ D
′ ∧ e′i = decidei(D
′) ∈ Ei ∧ e
′
i 6= ei.
Informally, this means that if a correct validator decides, no
other correct validator can make a different decision.
2.4.2 Liveness
A DAG-consensus algorithm is live if the protocol guaran-
tees that for all i ∈ I , a correct validator V either has only
seen DAGs D such that decidei(D) = ∅ or V eventually
sees a DAG D such that decidei(D) ∈ Ei.
2.5 Algorithm Structure
We use the communicating event loop model, in which a
single thread pulls an event from a queue and processes
it before handling the next event. Each of the algorithms
included is presented as an initial state and several event
handlers. The event handlers each include a comment in-
dicating the state that gets read. We underline any state
that gets modified. Events may contain information; that
information is presented as arguments to the event handler.
2.6 Validators and Byzantine behavior
A Byzantine validator is one which behaves arbitrarily. We
denote by N then number of validators and f the number
of Byzantine validators in our network. A correct validator
is one that is not byzantine. We define a Non-Faulty Majority
(NFM ) as ⌈N−f+12 ⌉, and a Fault Tolerant Majority (FTM )
as ⌈N+f+12 ⌉ = NFM + f . Given an NFM , any FTM will
contain at least one validator from the NFM .
2.7 Layout of what follows
The rest of the paper has the following structure: In §3.1
we build Casanova-attest, a simple attestation protocol that
gives structure to the trivial consensus protocol. In §3.2 we
expand Casanova-attest to Casanova-conflict-attest, which
can handle conflicting transactions by using an auxiliary
consensus protocol. After defining some relevant terms in
§4, in §5.1 we expand Casanova-conflict-attest to Casanova-
conflict-exclude, which shows when we can avoid having to
use the auxiliary protocol. Finally, in §5.2 we show how to
build consensus natively into the structure with Casanova.
33 USING ATTESTATION TO IDENTIFY AND RESOLVE
CONFLICTS
3.1 An attestation protocol
In the majority of blockchain applications, the network’s
responsibility more closely resembles one of attestation
rather than consensus. Here we use attest to mean record
with evidence. More specifically, the problem of attestation is
to record events supplied by users in a partial order. Users
can request that a particular event e follow some other event
e′. In the absence of double spends, this is exactly what a
blockchain is doing, as creation of outputs must precede the
spending of those outputs. We sketch a simple attestation
protocol Casanova-attest:
Starting with the empty record (a genesis block), valida-
tors build a DAG both by adding blocks of their own and by
listening to their peers. To produce its own block, a validator
listens for (event-data, parent-hashes) tuples to record from
clients. The parent-hashes are hashes of events that must have
been recorded in order to record this tuple. If a validator
has recorded events matching all the parent hashes the user
requested, it will add the tuple to its next block. Otherwise it
ignores the request. Validators periodically produce blocks
b whose events are all of the unrecorded tuples they have
received and whose parents are all the leaves of the DAG
they have seen so far. Once a validator adds b to its DAG,
it communicates b to the rest of the validators. For pseu-
docode, see Algorithm 1.
When a validator receives a block from a peer, if it has
all of the block’s parents, it adds the block to its DAG. If not,
it waits until it has the parents in its DAG, and then adds
the block to its DAG.
If a validator has recorded an event, nothing in the proto-
col allows it to alter this record. Assuming all messages are
eventually delivered, every correct validator will eventually
record the event as well. In essence, Casanova-attest is a
trivial consensus protocol—consensus over a set of size 1—
where attestations grow in a DAG. Note that this does not
contradict the standard impossibility result [3], because we
are essentially building consensus on sets of size 1.
3.2 From attestation to consensus
Casanova-attest only works if there is no possibility of
conflict between the events to be recorded. We call events
with the possibility of conflict transactions. Assume that we
can handle up to f Byzantine faults, where N ≥ 3f + 1.
We modify Casanova-attest as follows to produce Casanova-
conflict-attest:
When a validator receives two blocks that contain con-
flicting transactions ei, e
′
i ∈ Ei, it attests to the fact that
it observed the conflict. The validators can then use some
other means (like Algorithm 22 from “Consensus in the
Presence of Partial Synchrony” [4]) to come to consensus
on some representative ei ∈ Ei. Upon achieving consensus,
each validator records the decision and the evidence pro-
duced by the side protocol in the DAG. Assuming that some
validator sees the conflict first and the others see it within
∆, the side protocol will have a delay of at most 2∆, and so
will eventually decide. For pseudocode, see Algorithm 2.
3.3 Selective consensus
If every transaction admits at least two conflicting alterna-
tives, the above protocol could require a run of Algorithm
22 for every transaction. It would be nice if we could lean
on the attestation DAG to avoid some of these runs. We
will need to introduce some DAG terminology in order to
describe a protocol that does so.
4 DAG PROPERTIES
4.1 Scoring blocks in a DAG
Wewant to solve the problem of assigning a set of validators
(voters) to the blocks in a DAG. We call this set the score.
Given the set, we can compute either a count or, more
generally, a weight. We are computing the score set as seen
by validator V . The score of a block is the union over
all self-or-descendant blocks of the validators that created
those blocks. More formally, for each block b, let Wb be the
validator that created the block. The score of b as computed
by V is
scoreV (b) := {Wb} ∪
⋃
c∈children(b)
scoreV (c).
This can be efficiently computed via any reverse topological
traversal.
4.2 Observed Sets
Each validator V also needs to compute the score as seen
by other validators when they created their blocks. In V ’s
view of the DAG, there is one most recent block created
by each correct validator. If there is more than one such
block for a validator U , U must have equivocated. A block
b is most recent for validator U if V has not seen a block
created by U that is a descendant of b. A validator’s most
recent block may be the genesis block, which is treated as
if it were created by all the validators. For each validator
U , V ’s view of U ’s score is computed as above, but on the
induced subgraph of the most recent block. If a validator U
has two or more most-recent blocks, V can simply exclude
them entirely and reduce N and f both by one, as V has
proof that U is faulty. We will represent V ’s view of U ’s
score at block b as viewscoreV (U, b)
Assume some weighting function weight which maps
validators to integer weights. In the simple case, weight
can be the constant function 1. We can extend this function
to sum over a set of validators. Given such a function, we
define a k-observed set as follows: A k-observed set, for a block
b is a set S of validators such that:
∀U ∈ S : weight(viewscoreV (U, b)) ≥ k
and
weight(S) ≥ k.
There is a straightforward algorithm to check for the exis-
tence of a k-observed set.
We will compute the score of transactions in a similar
manner, and unless otherwise modified, the score of a
transaction is the score of the block that contained it. If a
transaction is in more than one block, its score is the union
of the scores of the blocks that contain it.
4For the purpose of conflict resolution, some attestations
have rounds attached to them. When looking for a k-
observed set, the attestations must all belong to the same
round. Blocks from later rounds should be excluded when
traversing the DAG, and blocks from earlier rounds don’t
count when calculating the score for this round.
5 USING THE DAG TO REMOVE THE SIDE CONSEN-
SUS PROTOCOL
We now have enough DAG machinery to allow attestation
to do some of the consensus work.
5.1 Selective Consensus: Exclusion
We change Casanova-conflict-attest as follows to produce
Casanova-conflict-exclude. Note that the attestations de-
scribed here only apply to finding an FTM -observed set,
and are not part of the side protocol.
When a validator V receives two blocks that contain
conflicting transactions ei, e
′
i ∈ Ei, it attests to the fact that
it observed the conflict. It then computes the scores of the
conflicting transactions. If any validator had attested to a
transaction before attesting to the conflict, their attestation
toward the first transaction is included in the score, includ-
ing V if it attested. If V ’s observed score for the block
containing ei is FTM or greater, without seeing an FTM -
observed set, V joins the side consensus protocol with
altered initial conditions. For example, if we use Algorithm
22, V would join the protocol with a phase−1 lock on ei. See
the Appendix for a summary of Algorithm 22. There may
be other consensus algorithms that admit suitably altered
initial conditions.
If V does not see a score of FTM or greater for either
ei or e
′
i, it joins the side consensus protocol with standard
initial conditions. If V sees an FTM -observed set, it does
not join the side consensus protocol, but rather continues
to produce blocks attesting to the fact that it observed such
a set. This gives us two cooperatively overlapping decision
criteria: the first is observing an FTM -observed set, and
the second is receiving the decision of the side consensus
algorithm. For pseudocode, see Algorithm 3.
Lemma 5.1. If an FTM -observed set exists, then Algorithm 22
can only decide on the value attested by the FTM -observed set.
The proof is a straightforward alteration of Lemma 3.5
from “Consensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony.” [4],
because at least NFM correct processors start with a lock
on ei at phase −1. This means that if a validator receives
evidence of an FTM -observed set, they can stop the side
protocol, as the outcome is a foregone conclusion.
It is straightforward to see that if no such observed set
exists, then the correct processors join the side protocol
within ∆, and so the side protocol has a delay of at most
2∆, and will therefore converge.
5.2 Completely removing the side consensus algo-
rithm
We can now build in a consensus algorithm natively into
Casanova-conflict-exclude, and dispense with a side algo-
rithm. We call this Casanova.
We assume that validators produce a new block every
time unit δ. A round is defined as a fixed number of blocks.
Round 1 for a validator begins two blocks after the block
that begins round 0. Each round r ≥ 1 begins r + 1 blocks
after the block that began round r− 1 (that is, round r starts
r(r+3)
2 blocks after round 0). Validators can have locks on
a value which is internal state not externally visible. Locks
on a value have an associated round. Once a validator has a
lock on a value, it may release it only to take a lock with
a later associated round. This may be for the same or a
different value.
The state before a conflict is encountered is treated as
round −1. Upon encountering conflicting transactions ei
and e′i, round 0 for the conflict domain Ei begins. If a
validator has observed ei with a score of FTM or greater,
it has a round −1 lock on ei. If a validator observes some
transaction ei with a score of FTM or greater in any round
r, it takes a lock on ei, with the associated round r. If it has
a lock from a previous round p < r, it releases the earlier
lock and takes the later lock.
The validators must vote at the beginning of each round
r according to the following rules:
1) If the validator has a lock on ei from a previous
round p < r, the validator attests to their vote for ei
at the beginning of round r, and the DAG includes
their attestation that they did see a score of FTM
or greater in some previous round.
2) Otherwise, the validator records a vote for transac-
tion e′i ∈ Ei with the lowest hash seen so far. (Any
other deterministic ordering would work as well)
To bound the number of possibilities from a particular
exclusion set Ei, each validator may attest to at most 1
transaction from Ei. Conflicts may arise due to different
validators attesting to different transactions before seeing
blocks containing conflicting transactions. This bounds the
number of transactions that will be considered from any
given Ei to N − f + f(N − f).
If, for any r, a validator sees a round-r FTM -observed
set for a transaction ei, the validator decides on ei, and
attests to that fact. The validator no longer counts rounds,
but can continue with the attestation. Other validators will
eventually also see the same decision criteria. For pseu-
docode, see Algorithm 4.
5.3 Formal Decision Criteria
We define decidei as follows for Casanova. decidei(D) = ei
if ei ∈ Ei and D contains an FTM -observed set having
voted for ei in some round r. If an FTM -observed set exists
in more than one round, we take the value chosen in the ear-
liest round. Otherwise decidei(D) = {e ∈ D|index(e) = i}.
Assuming we have f or fewer Byzantine validators, this is
well defined because the existence of two or more FTM -
observed sets for different transactions ei 6= e
′
i would
require at least f + 1 equivocations.
5.4 Proof of Safety for Casanova
Assume some validator V with DAG D s.t. ei =
decidei(D) ∈ Ei, and let r be the round associated with the
decision. Then V observed an FTM -observed set. Of the
5FTM -observed set, at least an NFM must be locked on ei.
In order to unlock from ei, they must observe a transaction
e′i ∈ Ei in round r
′ > r with score FTM or greater. But
because at leastNFM are locked on ei, the greatest possible
score that could be seen is FTM − 1. This precludes the
formation of an FTM -observed set on e′i 6= ei, therefore no
two correct processors can decide on different values under
the assumed fault bounds. There is some earliest round rmin
where any validator decides. The above shows that if any
correct validator decides a round r > rmin, they will make
the same decision. 
5.5 Proof of Liveness for Casanova
We will prove liveness for some particular Ei ⊂ E; specifi-
cally, at least one representative ei ∈ Ei has been observed
by at least one correct validator. Assume a validator V with
DAG D s.t. decidei(D) ∈ P(Ei) ∧ decidei(D) 6= ∅. Assume
that round r is longer than 2∆. Then before the start of
round r + 1, there is at most one locked transaction: during
the round, all validators receive evidence of locks from all
correct validators. If two or more locks exist, the correct
validators will release all but one of them, the lock with
the highest round. If such a lock exists, then every correct
validator has received evidence for it. Then the blocks that
start round r + 1 will be received in enough time for an
FTM -observed set to form during the round. If a lock does
not exist at the start of round r + 1, a lock will occur within
N − f + f(N − f) additional rounds, because of the bound
on the number of possible conflicts that may be accepted. 
Algorithm 1 Casanova-attest
1: dag ← ({genesis},∅)
2: pending, waiting← ∅
⊲ Symbols underlined in the ”Uses:” comments may be
modified in the corresponding procedure
3: procedure RECEIVEBLOCK(b)
⊲ Uses: dag, pending
⊲ Possibly adds a peer’s block to the DAG
4: if parents(b) ⊂ dag then
5: q ← {b}
6: for b from q do
7: dag ← dag + b
⊲ satisfied returns the set of pending blocks
with all parents now in dag
8: s← satisfied(dag, pending)
9: q ← q + s
10: pending ← pending − s
11: end for
12: else
13: pending ← pending + b
14: end if
15: end procedure
16: procedure RECEIVEEVENT(event)
⊲ Uses: dag, waiting
⊲ Possibly add an event to our waiting set
17: if parents(event) ⊂ dag ∪ waiting then
18: waiting ← waiting + event
19: end if
20: end procedure
21: procedure TIMEEXPIRE
⊲ Uses: dag, waiting
⊲ Create a new block at a regular interval
22: b← newblock
23: b.parents← leaves(dag)
24: b.transactions← waiting
25: waiting ← ∅
26: dag ← dag + b
27: broadcast b to peers
28: end procedure
6Algorithm 2 Casanova-conflict-attest
1: dag ← ({genesis},∅)
2: pending, waiting, inprogress, resolved← ∅
⊲ Symbols underlined in the ”Uses:” comments may be
modified in the corresponding procedure
3: procedure RECEIVEBLOCK(b)
⊲ Uses: dag, pending, inprogress, resolved
⊲ Possibly adds a peer’s block to the DAG
4: if parents(b) ⊂ dag then
5: q ← {b}
6: for b from q do
7: t← transactions(b)
8: for all e ∈ t s.t. ∃e′ ∈ dag ∧ e′ 6= e
∧ index(e′) = index(e) do
⊲ For every newly found conflict
9: i← index(e)
10: if i ∈ inprogress then
11: add e to possible alternatives of ongo-
ing consensus protocol for i
12: else if i 6∈ resolved then
13: inprogress← inprogress+ i
14: begin side consensus protocol for i
15: end if
16: end for
17: dag ← dag + b
⊲ satisfied returns the set of pending blocks
with all parents now in dag
18: s← satisfied(dag, pending)
19: q ← q + s
20: pending ← pending − s
21: end for
22: else
23: pending ← pending + b
24: end if
25: end procedure
26: procedure RECEIVEEVENT(event)
⊲ Uses: dag, inprogress, resolved, waiting
⊲ Possibly add an event to our waiting set
27: if parents(event) ⊂ dag ∪ waiting then
28: i← index(event)
29: if i 6∈ inprogress ∪ resolved ∪ waiting then
30: waiting ← waiting + event
31: end if
32: end if
33: end procedure
34: procedure SIDECONSENSUSACHIEVED(i, resolution)
⊲ Uses: inprogress, resolved, waiting
⊲ Called when the side algorithm reaches a decision
35: inprogress← inprogress− i
36: resolved← resolved+ i
37: waiting ← waiting + resolution
38: end procedure
39: procedure TIMEEXPIRE
40: Unchanged from Casanova-attest
41: end procedure
Algorithm 3 Casanova-conflict-exclude
1: dag ← ({genesis},∅)
2: pending, waiting, inprogress, resolved← ∅
⊲ Symbols underlined in the ”Uses:” comments may be
modified in the corresponding procedure
3: procedure RECEIVEBLOCK(b)
⊲ Uses: dag, pending, inprogress, resolved
⊲ Possibly adds a peer’s block to the DAG
4: if parents(b) ⊂ dag then
5: q ← {b}
6: for b from q do
7: t← transactions(b)
8: for all e ∈ t s.t. ∃e′ ∈ dag ∧ e′ 6= e
∧ index(e′) = index(e) do
⊲ For every newly found conflict
9: i← index(e)
10: if dag + b has an FTM -observed set for
some e ∈ Ei then
11: resolved← resolved+ i
12: excluded← true
13: else
14: excluded← false
15: end if
16: if i ∈ inprogress and excluded then
17: stop participating in ongoing consen-
sus protocol for i
18: inprogress← inprogress− i
19: else if i ∈ inprogress and !excluded then
20: add e to possible alternatives of ongo-
ing consensus protocol for i
21: else if i 6∈ resolved and !excluded then
22: inprogress← inprogress+ i
23: begin side consensus protocol for i
24: end if
25: end for
26: dag ← dag + b
⊲ satisfied returns the set of pending blocks
with all parents now in dag
27: s← satisfied(dag, pending)
28: q ← q + s
29: pending ← pending − s
30: end for
31: else
32: pending ← pending + b
33: end if
34: end procedure
35: procedure RECEIVEEVENT(event)
36: Unchanged from Casanova-conflict-attest
37: end procedure
38: procedure SIDECONSENSUSACHIEVED(i, resolution)
39: Unchanged from Casanova-conflict-attest
40: end procedure
41: procedure TIMEEXPIRE
42: Unchanged from Casanova-conflict-attest
43: end procedure
7Algorithm 4 Casanova
1: dag ← ({genesis},∅)
2: pending, waiting, inprogress, resolved← ∅
⊲ Symbols underlined in the ”Uses:” comments may be
modified in the corresponding procedure
3: procedure RECEIVEBLOCK(b)
⊲ Uses: dag, pending, inprogress, resolved
⊲ Possibly adds a peer’s block to the DAG
4: if parents(b) ⊂ dag then
5: q ← {b}
6: for b from q do
7: t← transactions(b)
8: for all vote ∈ votes(b) do
9: i← index(vote)
10: if dag + b has a k-observed set for some
ei ∈ Ei and some round r then
11: resolved← resolved+ i
12: inprogress← inprogress− i
⊲ i may not belong to inprogress
13: end if
14: end for
15: for all e ∈ t s.t. ∃e′ ∈ dag ∧ e′ 6= e
∧ index(e′) = index(e) do
⊲ For every newly found conflict
16: if i ∈ inprogress then
17: add e to list of alternatives for Ei
18: else if i 6∈ resolved then
19: inprogress← inprogress+ i
20: Set up rounds for i, and add e, e′ to list
of alternatives for Ei
21: end if
22: end for
23: dag ← dag + b
⊲ satisfied returns the set of pending blocks
with all parents now in dag
24: s← satisfied(dag, pending)
25: q ← q + s
26: pending ← pending − s
27: end for
28: else
29: pending ← pending + b
30: end if
31: end procedure
32: procedure RECEIVEEVENT(event)
33: Unchanged from Casanova-conflict-exclude
34: end procedure
35: function COMPUTEVOTES
⊲ Uses: dag, inprogress
36: votes← ∅
37: for i ∈ inprogress where i starts a new round this
block do
38: if dag contains score of FTM or greater in any
round for i then
39: votes← votes+ vote for e ∈ Ei that achieved
FTM in most recent round
⊲ The above 2 lines handle the locking logic
40: else
41: votes ← votes+ vote for e ∈ Ei with lowest
hash
42: end if
43: end for
44: return votes
45: end function
46: procedure TIMEEXPIRE
⊲ Uses: dag, waiting
⊲ Create a new block at a regular interval
47: b← newblock
48: b.parents← leaves(dag)
49: b.transactions← waiting
50: waiting ← ∅
51: b.votes← ComputeV otes(dag)
52: dag ← dag + b
53: broadcast b to peers
54: end procedure
86 CONCLUSION
Casanova is an attestation-based Byzantine fault tolerant
algorithm for ongoing consensus on a causally linked DAG
of transactions. It is optimized for the case where the ma-
jority of transactions never see conflicts. It requires that
transaction conflicts partition the set of possible transac-
tions, a requirement that can be met in a ledger, but is not
met e.g. in Bitcoin [1]. A programmable blockchain using
this consensus algorithm would need to carefully match
the programming model to this requirement. Overall we
expect that the requirements can be met in a variety of useful
applications, and that the algorithm will scale very well.
We encourage researchers to extend these ideas to op-
timize other kinds of consensus protocols. We warmly
welcome efforts to implement Casanova and measure its
performance.
7 ACKNOWLEDGMENT
Some of our initial ideas were inspired by Vlad Zamfir
and his colleagues’ work on Casper [5]. The integrated
consensus protocol borrows heavily from Tendermint [6]
and Algorithm 22 from DLS [4].
REFERENCES
[1] S. Nakamoto. (2009, October) Bitcoin: A peer-to-peer electronic
cash system. [Online]. Available: http://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf
[2] T.-H. H. Chan, R. Pass, and E. Shi, “Pala: A simple partially
synchronous blockchain,” IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive, vol. 2018,
p. 981, 2018.
[3] M. J. Fischer, N. A. Lynch, and M. S. Paterson, “Impossibility
of distributed consensus with one faulty process,” J. ACM,
vol. 32, no. 2, pp. 374–382, Apr 1985. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/3149.214121
[4] C. Dwork, N. Lynch, and L. Stockmeyer, “Consensus in
the presence of partial synchrony,” J. ACM, vol. 35,
no. 2, pp. 288–323, Apr. 1988. [Online]. Available:
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/42282.42283
[5] V. Zamfir, N. Rush, A. Asgaonkar, and G. Piliouras.
(2018, Nov) Introducing the “minimal cbc casper”
family of consensus protocols. [Online]. Available:
https://github.com/cbc-casper/cbc-casper-paper/blob/5f1dc67972180b90c7a411995082235bbfff2059/cbc-casper-paper-draft.pdf
[6] J. K. Kwon. (2014) Tendermint : Con-
sensus without mining. [Online]. Available:
https://cdn.relayto.com/media/files/LPgoWO18TCeMIggJVakt tendermint.pdf
APPENDIX
Algorithm 22 from DLS
We provide a brief outline of Algorithm 22 from “Con-
sensus in the Presence of Partial Synchrony.” [4]. The al-
gorithm is organized into phases each phase consisting of
four rounds: accept, propose, acknowledge, lock-release. Within
a phase, each round is a fixed length. In each subsequent
phase, the round length is increased by some constant δ.
The algorithm starts with phase 0, and each phase has an
associated leader, in round robin fashion. Each message
includes the phase to which it belongs, and is authenticated.
Processors may have locks on a value, and each lock has an
associated phase, and associated proof of acceptability. If a
processor has a lock on a value, that is its only acceptable
value. If it has a lock on multiple values, no value is
acceptable. Otherwise, any proper value is acceptable. We
can ignore proper for our purposes.
In the accept round, each processor sends an authenti-
cated message containing a list of acceptable values to the
leader of the phase.
In the propose round, if the leader received N − f mes-
sages stating that a value v was acceptable it may propose v.
If more than one such v is acceptable, it chooses arbitrarily.
It sends to each processor an authenticated message (lock
v, proof). If it did not receive enough messages, it refrains
from sending a lock message.
If a processor receives a valid lock message during the
propose round, it takes a lock on v with associated phase
k. If it already had a lock on v, it releases the earlier lock.
It does not release locks on other values at this time. If it
receives more than one such message, it takes locks on all
such values.
In the acknowledge round, processors send acknowledg-
ments for the lock messages received in the propose round
to the round leader. If the leader receives an NFM of
acknowledgements for their lock message, they decide on
v. The leader continues to participate.
In the lock release round, processors broadcast the lock
messages that caused them to lock a specific value for any
locks they currently hold. If they receive a lock on a value
w with phase k′ and they have a lock on v 6= w at phase
k′ ≥ k, the processor releases its lock on v.
